

Discussion of Gómez (2009): *Capital flows and monetary policy*

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Do the choice of monetary policy regime and the currency denomination of foreign debt really matter for an (emerging market) economy facing capital outflows?

YES!

OH YES!

- Highly leveraged economy and widespread FX borrowing
- Large credit expansion and asset price boom since early noughties (coinciding with liberalisation and privatisation of banks) led to sky-rocketing private demand
- Substantial appreciation of ISK followed by sharp depreciation through 2008 (global liquidity measures fell, credit default swaps for Iceland rose)
- Banking sector collapsed in autumn 2008
- Sharp fall in asset prices, and increase in debt levels
- Relatively tight monetary policy and IMF programme including capital controls to avoid further weakening of ISK
- Bankruptcies and large contraction in domestic demand
- Positive contribution from net export (large import contraction) limits fall in output

- Paper argues that model captures 'sudden stops' as result of exogenous shock to country risk premium
- However, this is not a model of financial crisis
 - Small deviations from well-defined steady state
 - No permanent wealth transfers
 - No banks
 - No bankruptcies
 - No sustainability issues
 - No credibility and confidence issues
- Tailored to explore effects in 'normal times'
- Illustrate many of the mechanisms nevertheless!

- Carefully done!
- But a couple of issues with short-cuts

$$E(XY) \neq E(X)E(Y)$$

$$\alpha_t \equiv \frac{B_{F,t}^*}{P_t N_t} \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha$$

$$(1 + \phi_{C,t}) = (N_{t-1})^{-\zeta} (1 + \varepsilon_t^{\phi_C})$$

- Endogenous country risk premium subject to shock but no financial accelerator
- The central bank has conventional monetary policy instruments at its disposal
- Positive risk premium shock gives central bank the choice between
 - Increasing interest rates along with risk premium to support exchange rate
 - Allowing exchange to depreciate by avoiding increases in interest rate (beyond what is needed to induce determinacy)
- Choice determines outcome to positive risk premium shock
 - Higher interest rates depress aggregate demand and lead to a recession
 - A depreciated exchange rate stimulates net exports and leads to expansion

- A recession caused by the interest rate defence of an exchange rate peg may be the mechanism Chari, Kehoe and McGratten AER 2005 were looking for
- Common argument against IMF prescriptions
- Effect is real but ignores important policy concerns
 - Small illiquid FX market may be overwhelmed by flows
 - Overshooting may complicate balance sheet reconstruction
 - Confidence in currency may be compromised
 - Credibility of monetary policy may need restoration
 - Debt dynamics may become unsustainable
 - Balance sheet effects may come to dominate
- Recognition of monetary policy trade-offs essentially reason why capital controls are part of IMF programme for Iceland

- Consider the effect of changing the currency composition of debt in baseline model with floating exchange rates
 - Small feedback effect of debt dynamics - and therefore of currency composition - on risk premium and real economy as ζ is small
 - But higher α works to increase debt on impact of a positive premium shock due to valuation effect of depreciation
 - This leads to a higher country risk premium through the endogenous component
 - ...and further depreciation and a larger net export boom (allowing debt to recover quickly)
- Normal times: More foreign currency denominated debt likely to increase fluctuations slightly with floating rates
- Welfare analysis and comparison of regimes with Ramsay plan would be nice extension

- Balance sheet effect on aggregate demand is added to baseline model: Aggregate demand decreasing in debt
- If economy is highly indebted (strong valuation effect) and not too open (net export effect not too strong), the balance sheet effect may result in recession also under float
- But what is the effect of the currency composition?
 - Higher α likely to deepen recession
- Again, welfare analysis and comparison to Ramsey plan would be helpful
- Normal times: Seems that peg may be preferable in open resilient economies and float in less open and vulnerable ones.

- Compared to Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci JMCB 2007...
 - Observe that 'defending an exchange rate peg generally requires the central bank to adjust interest rates in a direction that reinforces the crisis'
 - Financial accelerator contractionary (abandoned peg)
 - A higher share of foreign currency denominated debt enhances financial accelerator effect (float less attractive but still dominant)
- ...what exactly is the contribution in this paper?
 - Analysis of effects from currency composition on output?
 - Debt dynamics?
 - More thorough analysis of combinations (regime, indebtedness, openness, currency composition)?
 - Normal times or crisis?
 - Response to Chari, Kehoe and McGratten AER 2005?

- Parsimonious balance sheet feedback mechanism has appeal but boom-bust cycles suggest that there is more to the story
- Financial accelerator: Effects stemming from borrower balance sheets
- Icelandic experience: Sharp contraction also in the supply of credit (following a long period of unsustainable credit expansion)
- Banking likely to be vital for balance sheet effects (beyond the value of μ) as well as endogenous dynamics of risk premium
- Maybe news shocks, updating or learning/misperception mechanisms
- Shocks elsewhere, e.g. in banking sector, that generate endogenous movements in country risk (perceptions)?